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Introduction 
 
The last two decades have generated substantial demand for accounting techniques that paint a dire 
picture of government finances. In the early 1990s “generational accounting” showed a lifetime tax 
burden of 80 or 90 percent for generations yet to be born.1 After this became discredited,2 it became 
popular to express liabilities of programs like Social Security and Medicare over an infinite horizon.3 
These projections could show deficits in hundreds of trillions of dollars. A more modest approach is 
to calculate the gap between the benefits promised to current beneficiaries and the current and past 
taxes paid by these beneficiaries.4 This produces a deficit in the high tens of trillions of dollars. This 
methodology conceals both that the numbers actually don’t seem that large expressed relative to 
future GDP and that they are driven almost entirely by projections of exploding private-sector 
health care costs. 
 
These scary numbers are useful for those who want to force cuts to Social Security, Medicare and 
other social welfare programs. By making the government’s financial situation appear far more dire 
than is actually the case and concealing the extent to which the real problem is the country’s health 
care system, these accounting techniques can make it appear that there is no alternative to 
substantial cuts in social welfare programs.  
 
The publicity given to the recent spate of papers showing large unfunded liabilities for public 
pensions must be understood in this context.5 These papers purport to show unfunded liabilities for 
these pension funds in the range of $3-4 trillion as opposed to the roughly $1 trillion in unfunded 
liability reported using the accounting of the funds themselves. The basis for the difference is that 
these papers discount pension fund liabilities using either the interest rate on corporate bonds or the 
“risk-free rate of return” on Treasury bonds. These interest rates are considerably below the 7.5-8.0 
percent return assumed by pension fund managers, which leads to a much higher calculation of 
future liabilities.  
 
Three separate issues have been raised in assessing pension liabilities: 
 
1) The appropriate rate of discount to use in attaching a value to these liabilities; 
2) The accounting rule that should be used in determining the proper funding level; and  
3) The appropriate mix of assets to be held by public pensions. 
 
This paper does not address the first issue. It is standard to use a risk-free rate of return in 
calculating future liabilities. Arguably this should be used with pension liabilities as well.  
 
The paper does not directly discuss the appropriate mix of assets for pension funds to hold, 
although it is worth noting that long-lived entities like state and local governments are far better 
situated than individuals to absorb the timing risk associated with holding equities. Any argument 
that state and local pension funds should not hold equities would have to address the fact that 
individual workers do routinely hold equities in their retirement accounts. It would be difficult to 
                                                 
1 See Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991), Kotlikoff (1993), and Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1995). 
2 See Baker (1995) and Congressional Budget Office (1995). 
3 See, for example, Gokhale and Smetters (2003). 
4 See, for example, Government Accountability Office (2008). 
5  See, for example, Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009). 
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develop a logic whereby individual workers are better situated to bear the timing risk associated with 
equities than state and local governments. 
 
The focus of this paper is on the second point, the appropriate rule for pension funds to use in 
assessing their funding situation. This paper argues that pension funds should adopt a funding 
principle that is consistent with a return on holdings conditional on the state of the market. As will 
be shown, the expected “conditional rate of return” used in making this assessment will vary 
depending on the current ratio of stock prices to trend corporate earnings.6 This funding rule will 
lead to a more even flow of contributions into the fund than a rule that is based on a fixed return for 
assets over time.  
 
It is especially important to make this sort of adjustment to expected returns in “bubble” periods 
where price-to-earnings (PE) ratios in the stock market grow out of line with historic patterns. Such 
periods virtually guarantee a period of below-normal returns. During such periods, a pension fund 
that does not adjust its expected returns, and therefore its funding levels, will end up substantially 
underfunded after the bubble bursts.  
 
This rule also avoids the excessive build-up of funds that would result from applying a risk-free 
discount rate in a context where pension funds actually earned higher rates of return on average. The 
bad event resulting from having an underfunded pension is the need to have greater than normal 
funding – implicitly raising taxes for the governmental unit affected. However, a period of excessive 
contributions needed to build up reserves to meet a more stringent funding rule also implies higher 
taxes. It can’t make sense to deliberately have a period of higher taxes with certainty in order to 
avoid the possibility of higher taxes at some point in the future.  
 
An optimal funding rule would maintain a roughly constant ratio of contributions to payouts. If a 
pension invests in risky assets it will inevitably lead to situations in which the fund has greater or 
lower than desired levels of reserves, depending on actual market returns. An optimal funding rule 
would maintain funding in a way that minimizes the frequency and size of the divergences from full 
funding. Both situations imply greater contributions than necessary: either to build up the surplus or 
to compensate for the shortfall. If pension fund managers are seeking to avoid an excessive tax 
burden at a particular point in time, then a surplus or shortfall are both evidence of bad 
management. The surplus implies bad management because the tax burden was effectively higher 
than necessary during the period in which the surplus was accumulated and the shortfall implies that 
taxes will be higher than would have been implied by normal funding in the future. 
 
The rest of this paper describes more carefully a funding rule that discounts future obligations based 
on a discount rate based on the conditional return on a standard pension portfolio. It uses data on 
stock and bond returns over the last 135 years to construct simulations comparing the performance 
of a pension fund that used this funding rule with the performance of a pension fund that 
determined contributions by discounting by a risk-free rate of return on the same assets. 
 
 
                                                 
6 This funding rule was first described in Weller and Baker (2005). At the time, because of the high price-to-earnings 
ratios in the stock market, the rule would have implied that pension funds should have used a lower discount rate than 
the 8.0 percent that they were then employing.  
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Alternative Pension Funding Rules: Risk-Free Rate of 
Return versus Economically-Conditional Rate of Return 
 
The simulations in this paper define a pension as being “fully funded” if its current assets are 
sufficient to cover the next 30 years of projected payouts based on a given discount rate.  In keeping 
with this definition, we apply a rule that regardless of the current funding level, contributions to the 
pension must be sufficiently large so that in 10 years the pension will be fully funded based on the 
chosen discount rate. (The appendix provides a full description of the basis for the simulations.)  
 
Suppose that in 2012, we seek to have in 2022 a pension that is fully funded.  This means that in 
2022 we must have pension assets equal to discounted payouts over 2022-51.  By 2022, the pension 
will have paid out benefits over 2012-21 and collected contributions over the same time.  Therefore, 
the funding goal requires that current assets plus discounted contributions over the next ten years 
must be no less than discounted payouts over 2012-51—that is, the next 40 years. 
 
For a pension that will pay benefits totaling $1 million this year and will increase by 5 percent 
annually, this calculation is illustrated in Table 1.  If we assume a 5 percent discount rate, then the 
pension must have $30 million on hand (column 2) to be considered fully funded—more if a lower 
discount rate is used, and less if a higher discount rate is used.  In 10 years, however, the pension 
will need to have $48.9 million in assets.  At 5 percent interest, we need $30 million today (column 
4) to reach that goal.  Consequently, all benefits over the next 10 years (column 3) need to be paid 
without spending any of the initial $30 million.  That is, it is necessary to contribute $10 million 
(column 5) to the pension.  With $10 million in contributions and $10 million in payouts, this results 
in a contribution rate of 100 percent of payouts. 
 
TABLE 1 
Computing Contributions To A Fully Funded Pension 
Discount Rate 
(percent) 
Initial Assets 
(millions of $) 
Discounted Payouts  Contributions  
Years 1-10  
(millions of $) 
Contribution 
Rate  
(percent) 
Years 1-10 
(millions of $) 
Years 11-40 
(millions of $) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = (3) + (4) - (2) (6) = (5)/(3) 
3 40.2 10.9 48.7 19.4 178 
5 30.0 10.0 30.0 10.0 100 
8 20.5 8.8 15.5 3.8 43 
 
Now suppose that we assume an 8 percent discount rate.  Because we are more heavily discounting 
the future, we need only $20.5 million today to be fully funded.  In ten years, we will need $33.5 
million in assets, but because we are imputing a higher rate of interest, we need today only set aside 
$15.5 million to reach that goal.  This leaves $5 million, which may be used to pay benefits over the 
next 10 years.  At our 8 percent discount rate, we need $8.8 million today to pay these benefits, 
leaving us $3.8 million shy.  If we make pension contributions equal to 43 percent of each year’s 
payouts, then the pension will still be fully funded in 10 years. 
 
Similarly, a much lower discount rate will require greater initial resources to be fully funded, and also 
require larger contributions.  This would make it appear that a higher discount rate is preferable, but 
only because we have simply assumed a higher return on assets. 
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In Table 1, we assumed for simplicity that the actual return on assets equaled the chosen discount 
rate.  In the real world-- though the pension manager chooses the discount rate-- the market 
determines the actual return on pension assets.  Thus, we wish to separate the effect of the choice of 
discount rate from the actual return on assets.  In Table 2, we see the results after one year, 
assuming the mix of assets in each case is exactly the same and in every case produces the same 5 
percent return. 
 
TABLE 2   
First Year Fully-Funded Pension Performance with 5% Market Return and Selected Discount Rates 
Discount Rate 
(percent) 
Initial Assets 
(millions of $) 
Payouts 
(millions of $) 
Contributions 
(millions of $) 
5% Market 
Return on 
Assets 
(millions of $) 
Assets at End 
of Year 
(millions of $) 
Full Funding in 
Start of Next 
Year 
(millions of $) 
3 40.2 1.0 1.8 2.0 43.0 42.2 
5 30.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 31.5 31.5 
8 20.5 1.0 0.4 1.0 21.0 21.6 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, actual performance that is higher than the selected discount rate results in 
an overfunding of the pension, while lower market performance leads to underfunding.  These 
funding issues may become chronic, with contribution rates falling over time.  With higher 
performance the pension may become effectively fully pre-funded, paying for all future benefits out 
of interest alone.  It is hard to imagine it good policy to take money from workers today to fund the 
retirements of future workers who will enjoy higher real incomes. 
 
While the selection of a lower discount rate may help prevent underfunding, a fully pre-funded 
pension with a low discount rate will suffer correspondingly larger losses in a bear market and may 
necessitate even greater contributions to rebuild those assets.   
 
Conversely, in Table 3 we see the contribution rates needed in response to an initial underfunding 
of 20 percent based on various discount rates. At a 5 percent discount rate, the 20 percent shortfall 
raises the first-year contributions from $1 million to $1.6 million.  While this jump in contributions 
may be undesirable, it is still less than the $1.78 million (Table 1) that would be required for a 
pension fully funded under a 3 percent discount rate. 
  
TABLE 3 
Pension Contributions Required to Correct 20% Underfunding at Selected Discount Rates  
Discount Rate 
(percent) 
Initial Assets 
(millions of $) 
Discounted Payouts  Contributions   
Years 1-10 
(millions of $) 
Contribution 
Rate 
(percent) 
Years 1-10 
(millions of $) 
Years 11-40 
(millions of $) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = (3) + (4) - (2) (6) = (5)/(3) 
3 32.2 10.9 48.7 27.5 252 
5 24.0 10.0 30.0 16.0 160 
8 16.4 8.8 15.5 7.9 89 
 
Finally, even if a bear market never comes, shifting from a higher to lower discount rate requires the 
immediate building-up of assets.  Suppose we wish to protect ourselves against a future situation in 
which the pension is only 80 percent funded at a 5 percent discount rate—i.e., when we would want 
to have $30 million, but find only $24 million on hand.  If, in order to avoid that future $6 million 
shortfall, we lowered the discount rate to 3 percent today, this would result in an immediate $10.2 
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million shortfall.  Table 4 shows the required contribution rates that result from raising or lowering 
the discount rate. 
 
TABLE 4 
Pension Contributions Required to Achieve Full Funding at Selected Discount Rates 
Discount Rate 
(percent) 
Initial Assets 
(millions of $) 
Discounted Payouts  Contributions  
Years 1-10 
(millions of $) 
Contribution 
Rate 
(percent) 
Years 1-10 
(millions of $) 
Years 11-40 
(millions of $) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = (3) + (4) - (2) (6) = (5)/(3) 
3 30.0 10.9 48.7 29.6 271 
5 30.0 10.0 30.0 10.0 100 
8 30.0 8.8 15.5 --* --* 
* No contributions are required in this scenario. 
 
Addressing the Real Risk of Shortfalls 
Lowering the discount rate is a strange policy choice that avoids possible large future contributions 
by insisting on large contributions today.  But the greatest risk of adverse market outcomes does not 
come from a collapse in the price of a fairly-valued asset temporarily becoming undervalued.  
Rather, downside risk comes primarily from the collapse in the price of an overvalued asset when 
suddenly valued according to fundamentals. 
 
In the housing bubble of the 2000s, there was a prevailing insistence that housing prices could not 
fall.  Lenders encouraged borrowers to leverage up on the assumption that prices would continue to 
rise even as rents stayed low, implying an ever-higher sales price-to-rent ratio.  Similarly, in the stock 
bubble of the 1990s, there was remarkable insistence that equities would produce historical rates of 
return no matter how expensive stocks became in relation to the earnings the companies had any 
hope of distributing in dividends. 
 
In short, failure to adjust expectations to the state of the market at those points in time caused 
considerable pain for many people as well as institutional investors—such as pensions.  In order to 
mitigate the effects of a downturn, it is important both to discount at a realistic rate of return on 
assets and to adjust that expected rate of return as market conditions require. 
 
In 1919, the price-to-earnings ratio in the S&P 500 stood at less than 6:1 and over the next 10 years 
produced a real total return of 19 percent per year.  By contrast, the PE ratio had skyrocketed to 
over 40:1 in 1999.  From 1999 to 2009 the real total return on the S&P 500 was -4.2 percent per 
year.  In neither 1919 nor 2009 should one have expected a normal rate of return on stocks.  Figure 
1 below shows the historical relationship between the PE ratios and stock returns. 
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FIGURE 1 
10-Year Forward Real Annual Return to S&P 500 and PE Ratio 
 
Sources:  Shiller (2005), Shiller (2011), and authors’ calculations. 
 
Thus, we propose a rule for conditionally adjusting the expected rate of return on stocks so that the 
PE ratio returns to 15:1 over the course of 10 years based on projected earnings. 
 
Simulation under Different Rules 
We now compare pension performance under different discount rates: first by selecting a risk-free 
rate based on 10-year Treasury bonds plus one percentage point, then by selecting an economically-
conditional rate based on a portfolio of 60 percent stock and 40 percent risk-free bonds.  In each 
case the actual portfolio is 60 percent S&P 500 stock and 40 percent bonds, but the conditional 
discount rate is adjusted each year for the current PE ratio as discussed above. 
 
The first difference between the two pensions is the level of assets required in each case to be 
considered fully funded.  As the S&P 500 can be generally expected to outperform bonds, the 
conditional rate at such times discounts more heavily future payouts and therefore carries a lower 
asset burden than a pension using a risk-free rate.  Figure 2 shows that in a typical year some $1.30 
in assets are required under the lower risk-free rate for every dollar required under the economically 
conditional rate. 
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FIGURE 2 
Level of Pension Assets Required to Qualify As Fully Funded under “Economically-Conditional” and “Risk-
Free” Discount Rates 
 
Sources:  Johnston and Williamson (2011); Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts 
Tables 1.1.5, 1.1.6, and 1.10; Shiller (2005), Shiller (2011), and authors’ calculations. 
 
Of particular interest is the late 1990s, when the relationship inverts.  As the stock market became 
overvalued, the expected return on stocks fell well below that of safe bonds.  Rather than relying on 
an already-large stock of assets, the choice of a conditional discount rate required additional asset 
accumulation to build up a reserve against the expected fall in stock prices.  By construction, this 
build-up would have taken place during the run-up of asset prices.  Rather than requiring very large 
contributions, the bubble itself would have done much the “work” of building up the asset base.  
Consequently, any taxes required would not have been greatly burdensome. 
 
Similarly, as the bubble burst, the conditional rate fell, permitting the pension to maintain a smaller 
base of assets.  Yet the choice of a risk-free rate would have required the maintenance of a large base 
of assets even as those pension assets lost considerable value.  In order to prevent that fall, larger 
contributions would be needed. 
 
In Figure 3, we see the required contributions under each discount rate, assuming that each pension 
is fully funded at the start of the year.  Typically, the conditional discount rate would require 
contributions to a fully funded pension in the amount of 50 to 100 percent of annual payouts.  By 
contrast, a risk-free discount rate would require much larger contributions. 
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FIGURE 3 
Pension Contribution Rates Required to Maintain Full Funding Under Conditional and Risk-Free Discount 
Rates  
 
Sources:  Johnston and Williamson (2011); Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts 
Tables 1.1.5, 1.1.6, and 1.10; Shiller (2005), Shiller (2011), and authors’ calculations. 
 
In 2000, the economically-conditional rate of return on stocks was extremely low.  The choice of 
conditional discount rate required a higher contribution rate than that of any other of any year on 
record.  Yet, a pension fully funded under the choice of a risk-free rate would have required 
contributions even larger than those under the conditional rate. 
 
Of course, pensions are rarely exactly fully funded.  During the run-up of an asset bubble, the 
pension may become overfunded, leading to a fall in contributions.  Rather than examining fully 
funded pensions in various years, it is important to observe the performance of pension rules over 
time. 
 
First, a proposed switch in the discount rate affects the current funding status of the pension.  Absent 
a very large contribution, a decrease in the chosen discount rate pushes a pension farther below full 
funding, as in the examples of Table 4.  Figure 4 shows the first-year contribution rates under two 
scenarios.  In each, the pension begins fully funded based on a conditional discount rate and must 
aim to be fully funded in ten years.  In one scenario, the pension continues to operate under the 
conditional discount rate; in the other, the pension immediately switches to a risk-free discount rate. 
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FIGURE 4 
First-Year Pension Contribution Rates Required to Maintain Full Funding under Conditional and Risk-Free 
Discount Rates 
 
Sources:  Johnston and Williamson (2011); Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts 
Tables 1.1.5, 1.1.6, and 1.10; Shiller (2005), Shiller (2011), and authors’ calculations. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4, the switch generally results in an immediate underfunding under the new 
discount rate and so initial contribution rates are much higher.  On the other hand, the actual 
portfolio risk is assumed to be identical, so this often leads to overfunding.  Figure 5 shows 
simulated pension assets under each discount rate as a share of full funding.  In the figure, both are 
assumed to begin in the year 1885 with identical assets sufficient to fully fund the pension under the 
economically-conditional discount rate.  In that year, the risk-free discount rate implies 
underfunding, but by 1900 the pension is overfunded. 
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FIGURE 5 
Pension Funding Under Conditional and Risk-Free Discount Rates, 1885 to Present 
 
Sources:  Johnston and Williamson (2011); Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts 
Tables 1.1.5, 1.1.6, and 1.10; Shiller (2005), Shiller (2011), and authors’ calculations. 
 
Over time, the risk-free discount rate leads to a tremendously overfunded pension.  By the peak of 
the stock bubble, the pension holds more than three times the required assets.  At the peak in 2000, 
the pension holds assets of more than 120 times the year’s payouts and has become entirely pre-
funded—having made no contribution since 1943.  While it may be comforting to know that future 
pension obligations may be met without making contributions, it is less comforting to know that 
baby boomer pensions were paid for primarily by workers who were born during the Civil War and 
those who fought in World War II. 
 
The degree of overfunding in and among simulations varies greatly.  Figure 6 shows the simulated 
funding levels under a switch to a risk-free discount rate—just as in Figure 5.  However, rather than 
comparing the funding level to a no-switch baseline, Figure 6 shows the simulation in comparison to 
alternative switch dates—1885, 1886, and so on through a switch date of 1995. 
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FIGURE 6 
Simulated Pension Assets—Transition to A Risk-Free Discount Rate by Year of Switch. 
 
Sources:  Johnston and Williamson (2011);  Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts 
Tables 1.1.5, 1.1.6, and 1.10; Shiller (2005), Shiller (2011), and authors’ calculations. 
 
There is less variation among the simulations than Figure 6 seems to indicate.  In fact, whether or 
not a pension becomes overfunded depends greatly on the year in which the simulation starts.  This 
is seen in Figure 7 below.  The left of Figure 7 is identical to Figure 6, but shows only the 
simulations that start in 1885-1918.  A switch to a risk-free discount rate in any of these years leads 
to overfunding.  The right of Figure 7 is similar, but shows only the simulations that start in 1936-
95.  These simulations show pensions that are much less overfunded. 
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FIGURE 7 
Simulated Pension Assets—Starts in 1885-1918 and 1936-1995 
 
Sources:  Johnston and Williamson (2011); Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts 
Tables 1.1.5, 1.1.6, and 1.10; Shiller (2005), Shiller (2011), and authors’ calculations. 
 
Even pensions that are initially fully funded under the choice of risk-free discount rate may be 
required to make large contributions over time.  On the left of Figure 8 are the simulated 
contribution rates over time for pensions operating under the choice of a conditional discount rate.  
Each line corresponds to a single simulation in which the pension starts fully funded in a given year.  
In the right are the simulated contribution rates over time for pensions operating under the choice 
of a risk-free discount rate.  Unlike the simulations of Figure 7, these pensions begin fully funded 
under the risk-free rate, so there is no need for any initial building of assets. 
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FIGURE 8 
Simulated Pension Contribution Rates—Fully Funded At Start of Simulation 
 
Sources:  Johnston and Williamson (2011);  Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts 
Tables 1.1.5, 1.1.6, and 1.10; Shiller (2005), Shiller (2011), and authors’ calculations. 
 
Under the economically-conditional discount rate, pensions rarely must make contributions in 
excess of payouts.  That is, in most years benefits are partially funded out of assets and interest.  On 
the other hand, it is far more common for a pension funded under a risk-free discount rate to pay 
current benefits exclusively out of contributions.  Figure 9 shows the percentage of simulations in 
which required contributions are zero (green), less than or equal to payouts (red), and greater than 
payouts (blue). 
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FIGURE 9 
Percentage of Simulations with Zero, Moderate and Large Contributions 
 
Sources:  Johnston and Williamson (2011); Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts 
Tables 1.1.5, 1.1.6, and 1.10; Shiller (2005), Shiller (2011), and authors’ calculations. 
 
We can see in Figures 8 and 9 that the worst outcomes under the conditional discount rate (that is, 
with the greatest need for contributions) come in the early 1920s.  Even so, the required 
contributions under the risk-free discount rate are even larger in these years.  Figure 10 below 
shows the range of simulated contribution rates in the years 1923-25.  As above, these simulations all 
start with fully funded pensions, and therefore do not reflect the need to build up assets in moving 
to a risk-free discount rate. 
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FIGURE 10 
Distribution of Simulated Contribution Rates By Year—1923-25 (Simulations Starting Fully Funded in 1885-
1922) 
 
Sources:  Johnston and Williamson (2011); Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts 
Tables 1.1.5, 1.1.6, and 1.10; Shiller (2005), Shiller (2011), and authors’ calculations. 
 
Similarly, the contribution rates in the lead-up to and through the early part of the Great Depression 
are striking, as shown in Figure 11. 
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FIGURE 11 
Distribution of Simulated Contribution Rates By Year—1927-35 (Simulations Starting Fully Funded in 1885-
1926) 
 
Sources:  Johnston and Williamson (2011); Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts 
Tables 1.1.5, 1.1.6, and 1.10; Shiller (2005), Shiller (2011), and authors’ calculations. 
 
Although economically-conditional pension contributions were modest prior to the Great 
Depression, the PE ratio for the S&P 500 fell below 10:1 in 1932-33—indicating an unusually large 
expected return.  Thus, contribution rates actually fell after the crash under the choice of 
economically-conditional discount rate.  By contrast, the use of a risk-free discount rate meant very 
low contribution rates as the stock market inflated—recognizing the existence of a very large asset 
cushion.  However, the implicit failure in the choice of risk-free discount rate to recognize that the 
market had subsequently overcorrected and would yield larger returns in turn exaggerated a need for 
very large contributions at the worst possible time. 
 
In effect, using the risk-free rate of return assumption would have required governments to impose 
large tax increases to fully fund their pensions in the middle of the Great Depression – even though 
such contributions were in fact unnecessary to maintain full funding, given the resulting returns in 
the stock market.  
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Conclusion 
 
The participants in the debate over pension accounting have a variety of agendas. If the purpose is 
to make the situation of these pension funds appear as dire as possible, then using a risk-free rate of 
return to assess their liabilities can be useful. However if the goal is to actually manage a pension 
fund holding equities in a way that minimizes the need to increase contributions above the normal 
level, and therefore implicitly raise taxes, then it is desirable to use a funding rule that is based on an 
economically conditional rate of return of the assets held by the fund. 
 
This paper uses data on stock returns dating back to the late 19th century to show that a pension 
fund that adjusted its expected return assumptions based on the ratio of stock prices to trend 
earnings would have a much smoother contribution path than a fund that always maintained full 
funding using the risk-free rate of return as the discount rate. The smoother funding course results 
not only from avoiding high taxes during the initial build-up period, but also by avoiding the sharp 
increases in funding that would be required after stock market crashes, such as those of 1929-30 and 
2000-2002. 
 
The choice of a risk-free discount rate reduces the risk that the long-run future value of assets is 
overstated.  However, in pension management that choice is not effective in avoiding the risk of 
improper funding.  If the goal of pension fund managers is to maintain a smooth flow of funding 
and avoid temporary tax increases needed to meet funding targets, then the conditional funding rule 
described in this paper is unambiguously superior to a funding scheme that maintains full funding 
using the risk-free rate of return as the discount rate.     
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Appendix: Forecast Methodology 
 
The historical index of risk-free returns is constructed from the Shiller 10-year bond data (Shiller 
2011), assuming a one-percentage-point premium reinvested annually. 
 
The GDP deflator is assumed to increase at the rate of the five years prior to and including the base 
year of the forecast.  All base-year prices (including January S&P) are known accurately.  All “real” 
values are discounted by the GDP deflator. (For 1929-2010, GDP and wage data are taken from the 
National Income and Product Accounts, Tables 1.1.5, 1.1.6, and 1.10. For years prior to 1929, data 
was taken from Johnston and Williamson (2011). 
 
In this paper, several long-term trends are constructed and used for forecasting purposes.  In most 
cases the data is log-transformed, a trend is estimated to be quadratic in time, and over 10 years 
from the most recent available data at the start of forecast. A return to that trend is assumed.  In 
general, forecasts made in January of a base year include historical data through the year prior. 
  
These trends include: 
 
 Population growth starting in 2011.  Pension managers are explicitly assumed to otherwise 
accurately forecast population, rather than project a return to trend. 
 Real GDP per-capita. 
 Wage share of GDP.  The (log) wage share prior to 1929 is assumed equal to the average in 
the years 1929-71.  From 1971 on, the trend is quadratic, but assumed to remain flat over 
time rather than swing upward. 
 A “risk-free” bond index.  The trend in the log index is assumed linear. 
 Real earnings.  (The nominal earnings and dividends for each year are Shiller’s figures for 
December of the year.) 
 
Pension payouts in each year are assumed to equal 95 percent of the previous year’s payouts 
(adjusted for price level of GDP), plus 0.1 percent of nominal wages (actual or projected) in each of 
the five prior years. 
 
Price forecasts for the S&P 500 are constructed based on a return to a cyclically adjusted PE ratio of 
15 over 10 years.  The PE ratio is constructed identically to Shiller’s formulation (except for the use 
of GDP deflator in lieu of CPI).  Specifically, the historical PE ratio is computed as the real S&P 500 
index divided by the average real earnings over the prior 10 years.  Over the next 10 years the PE 
ratio is assumed to move linearly to a value of 15 in the 10th year after the base year of the forecast.  
The forecast PE ratio is multiplied by the projected GDP deflator and projected 10-year average real 
earnings in order to arrive at a price projection. 
 
Dividends are forecast in multiple steps.  First, the historical dividend-to-earnings (DE) ratio is 
computed by dividing the average real dividends over the prior 10 years by the average real earnings 
over the prior 10 years.  Initially, the DE ratio is assumed to be unchanged in the forecasts, and 
therefore the unadjusted real annual dividends are those that maintain the DE ratio given the real 
earnings.  The (log) unadjusted dividends are replaced by their trend over the forecast period. 
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Pension Management 
Pensions are assumed to rebalance each January (base year/“year zero”) to hold 60 percent S&P 500 
stock and 40 percent risk-free bonds.  All dividends are reinvested, payouts and (if any) 
contributions made just prior to rebalancing.  The above forecast produces a discount rate based on 
the economically conditional rate of return on this pension portfolio as well as a risk-free rate based 
on 100 percent bonds.  Regardless of the discount rate applied, the actual pension portfolio is 
assumed to be “economically conditional” in the sense that the year-to-year return on the actual 
assets is uncertain. 
 
Our rule for a fully funded pension is that it holds assets equal to 100 percent of the present value of 
payouts over the next 30 years (years 0-29).  Thus, the assets required to meet the funding rule 
depends on the choice of discount rate.  Any pension shortfall must be restored over the next 10 
years as follows: 
 
Current assets (less) discounted payouts in years 0-9 are subtracted from discounted payouts in years 
10-39 to find the present value of contributions which must be made in order to forecast a fully-
funded pension in year 9.  (Equivalently, the discounted contributions must equal the difference 
between discounted payouts in years 0-39 minus current assets.)  The contribution rate is defined as 
this present value of required contributions divided by the present value of payouts over years 0-9.  
If the contribution rate is positive, then current-year contributions are made in the amount of 
current-year payouts times the contribution rate. 
 
In the first January of a multi-year simulation of pension performance, the “economically 
conditional" pension is assumed to hold assets sufficient to make it fully funded with respect to that 
conditional discount rate.  Typically, the “risk-free” pension is assumed to start with the same assets, 
but in some simulations may instead begin fully funded with respect to the choice of risk-free 
discount rate. 
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